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In 1960, the eminent physicist Eugene Wigner published an essay entitled “The Unreasonable Effectiveness
of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences” [1], in which he mused about the relationship between physics and
mathematics. Wigner expressed his surprise at how effective mathematics is in predicting the future physical
world, given certain initial conditions. To him, it seemed almost like a miracle that applying the rules of
mathematics over and over would not lead the practitioner into a “morass of contradictions”. He found it
striking that the world of mathematics has, at first glance, nothing to do with the physical world. Mathematics
permits concepts so abstract that they defy our imagination: they are only limited by the mathematician’s
ingenuity. To think that concepts such as complex numbers, for example, might be applicable to our physical
world in which everything is countable and real might seem ludicrous, until we discover that such concepts
are essential in understanding quantum mechanics. With that insight, we now know, comes breathtaking
predictability. Whenever we think that the chasm between an ever-expanding body of mathematics and our
physical theories is widening, a new development narrows it yet again, for example by realizing that an abstruse
mathematical invention like “Morse theory” turns out to be essential to understand complicated concepts in
theoretical physics such as supersymmetry [2]. Perhaps mathematics is even more unreasonably effective than
even Wigner dared to imagine?
Mathematics truly is the language of nature as Galileo wrote, and the present authors do not believe
that this is an accident that must be taken on faith. While mathematics is a system based on logic and
consistency, natural laws are based on causality and consistency. Now, logical inference and causality are not
the same thing, but in a computational view of physical law (nature “computes” the outcomes of experiments)
they become one and the same [3] (see also [4]). Yet it may seem like a surprise that physical theories can
describe and predict so much. After all, each and every physical situation is complicated by a myriad of initial
conditions, of which very few end up being important for prediction. In other words, a theory that describes
so much while assuming so little is certainly something special, in particular because it predicts outcomes that
by no means were inherent in the initial conditions. Indeed, therein lies the power of fundamental theories:
you get vastly more out of them than what you put in.
This detour about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in describing the physical world brings
us to the subject matter at hand, namely the question “What is the place of agent-based simulations in
Evolutionary Game Theory?”, along with a discussion of the effectiveness of such simulations. As the target
article [5] points out, Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) historically was formulated in purely mathematical
terms, and the theory was successful in the sense that it formalized concepts–such as the evolutionarily stable
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strategies (ESS)–that before their mathematical formulation appeared paradoxical. Of course, this is the
strength of the mathematical approach: by casting our thoughts into algebraic terms, we force our thoughts
to be logical, and we are led to a deeper understanding simply because our flawed intuitions are superseded by
the implacable logic and consistency of mathematics. But we may go further still: By consistently applying
the rules of logic to the edifice we created, we can be led to insights that were nowhere apparent when the
groundwork was laid. Thus, we obtain more than we put in.
Yet, mathematics as it is today cannot describe all of nature. Wigner in his essay wondered whether a
“theory of biology” must necessarily be consistent with theories of physics. In particular, one of the defining
features of physics, namely that physical laws depend on only very few variables (a stone falls according to
the same law and in the same way–never mind when, never mind where, never mind on Earth or the moon
or anywhere in the universe) seems not to hold for biological systems, where everything seems to depend on
everything else. This dependence on an enormous number of initial conditions, as opposed to only a handful,
makes it difficult to cast (shoehorn is used more often) biological systems into mathematical terms. Or, we
should say, more difficult to describe biological systems in such a way that their future can be predicted as
accurately as physics can predict physical systems.
When microscopic algebraic descriptions become unsolvable, computational simulations can take over.
There is no “theory of weather”, for example, but the computational simulations of a vast number of particles
under the influence of many forces and variables allows us to predict future states from past states, albeit with
great effort and with limited accuracy. Nobody would imagine that a simple formula will tell us whether it
will rain tomorrow at noon. Are computational simulations going beyond mathematics [6]? This question has
a different answer depending on how narrow once conceives of mathematics. Inside the computer, variables
are updated in a logical and consistent manner, and–barring a mistake–the mechanism will never create “a
morass of contradictions”. (Of course, the same can be said of mathematics.)
As opposed to mathematics, a computer can create predictions that have nothing to do with nature (and
thus end up in a morass of contradictions with the world). After all, it is the programmer who implements
the rules of progression (the model), and these may be well-chosen, or poorly. To validate the model, it must
be checked across a range of parameters, making contact with known results (often known via mathematics)
at the extreme values of the ranges. At the same time, the simulation results must be checked for internal
consistency, by creating an ensemble of “trajectories” via hundreds or thousand of replicate simulations.
To some, computational simulations are but an extension of the mathematician’s tool set, exerting control
over more variables than our consciousness (or our piece of paper) can keep track of. To others, mathematics
must display the relationship between variables openly: just “cranking the machine forward” to obtain a result
is insufficient, as it may lack the insight that a closed-form solution provides. We believe there are truths
in both points of views, and most of the comments to our article propose that both approaches–the formal
algebraic, as well as the computational–are used side-by-side, so as to harness the power of both worlds.
Schuster [7] in his contribution makes the link between evolutionary game theory and population genetics
more apparent. Indeed, there can be no doubt that EGT should be seen as a type of “effective theory” of
biological evolution. Mathematical population genetics is often described as “the theory of evolution”, but
just as microscopic theories in physics, population genetics can only describe simplified scenarios, such as the
evolution of one or several loci (traits) at the time. Schuster casts EGT in terms of the population genetics of
n loci, where each locus determines one strategy, and re-derives the differential equations of game dynamics
using this approach. He correctly points out that such an approach (which incidentally is isomorphic to the
system of equations pioneered by Eigen and Schuster [8, 9]), cannot describe what is special about evolution,
namely the emergence of new traits as well as the extinction of existing ones. Here again we note that in a
limited theory, you do not extract more from the theory than what you put in. However, this formulation has
several advantages over standard population genetics. For one, the theory describes evolutionary dynamics
at arbitrary mutation rates, as opposed to population genetics that is essentially the zero-mutation-rate limit
of Eigen-Schuster theory [10]. Second, frequency-dependent selection is built-in, while in the standard Crow-
Kimura formulation of population genetics [11] the fitness landscape is constant and independent of genotype
frequencies. As a matter of fact, in our review we point out that agent-based simulations of stochastic strategies
at finite mutation rate confirm that the strategies that dominate (indeed, are evolutionarily stable) are not
monomorphic, but rather are stationary mixtures of strategies that correspond precisely to the quasi-species
solutions of Eigen and Schuster.
In the end, this should not have surprised us. The replicator-mutator equations of EGT are effectively the
2
equations of Eigen and Schuster, and therefore have the same solutions at finite mutation rate. But Schuster
points out that analytical solutions to these equations are only possible for very simple fitness landscapes.
To go beyond those, he writes that “agent-based modeling is the method of choice”, but that nevertheless
important insights can be gained from the simple limiting cases.
Tarnita in her comment [12] makes a point worth repeating: just because the mathematical tools available
today are unable to describe a good fraction of the biologically relevant scenarios in EGT (most notably,
significant rates of mutation, strong selection, and spatial dynamics), this does not mean that those tools will
never be available, and one should not stop attempts at developing them just because agent-based simulations
are successfully tackling those situations today. Indeed, Tarnita has developed clever methods to deal with
the strong mutation regime, albeit in the limit where mutation rates are so large that all strategies are
equally likely (which is essentially the mutational meltdown regime [13, 14]). While it is possible to describe
intermediate mutation rates via an approximative interpolating scheme, the approach does not capture the
intricate interplay between the stochastic strategies that is the hallmark of quasistrategies described in the
target article. But to echo the comment that mathematical approaches should not be disregarded, much
more mathematical work is required to understand the nature of the quasistrategy, as it requires solving the
Fokker-Planck equation for the strategy distribution function in multiple dimensions [15].
Hilbe and Traulsen in their comment [16] marshal the now well-known backstory of how the ZD strategies
of Press and Dyson [17] were discovered, to illustrate what should perhaps be the most important “take-home-
message” of the target article as well as the comments: Mathematics and agent-based simulations should be
used side-by-side by anyone who is interested in making progress in the fascinating field of evolutionary game
theory. In the case of the ZD strategies, they were discovered after a fully numerical sweep turned out peculiar
regularities that cried out for an algebraic understanding. This is not the first time that results from a computer
simulation have hinted at underlying mathematical structures, nor will it be the last. The understanding,
of course, was provided by mathematics (in particular, Freeman Dyson’s, who is a mathematician turned
physicist). But for all the mathematical understanding, the evolutionary fate of ZD strategies is not currently
amenable to closed-form solution, even though it is not inconceivable that they may one day be. The agent-
based simulations of ZD strategy evolution in the target article revealed that at modest mutation rates, the
mathematically favored “generous” ZD strategies lose out to robust quasistrategies that are not of the ZD
type, because they are groups of strategies that support each other via mutations: the precise analogue of the
quasispecies of Eigen and Schuster.
As Hilbe and Traulsen point out, using agent-based simulations for discovery can be a dangerous under-
taking. The end result of a simulation is a set of numbers that were obtained from another set of numbers
that came from other numbers, through a sometimes million-fold iteration. How do you protect yourself from
random elements affecting your end result? Perhaps surprisingly, you do this as you do in any other scientific
endeavor. When deriving mathematical results (sometimes with hundreds if not thousands of transforma-
tions), you must constantly check against known results. Often, in a complex mathematical formula a limit
can be taken that should recover a known result. Researchers often go through such “sanity checks” to make
sure that no error has crept in while deriving new results that cannot be checked, simply because the results
are new. In long series of molecular lab bench experiments, practitioners also have checkpoints built in, as
well as controls, that allow them to catch mistakes. Computational science is no different in this respect. Neg-
ative controls must be run (as well as sometimes positive controls, if possible), and “sanity checks” must be
provided by examining limits where mathematical results are available. So, for example, when we determined
that robust quasistrategies can outperform the generous strategies of Stewart and Plotkin [18] in the strong
mutation regime, naturally we checked that if the mutation rate was brought into the weak mutation regime,
the generous strategies became victorious, as mathematics had predicted they would. So without a doubt,
agent-based simulations should never be the only approach taken. But not using this tool because results do
not immediately provide intuition, or because one can’t be sure that errors have crept in, would be akin to
disregarding the results of any experiment conducted anywhere.
Finally, the comment of Bellomo and Elaiw [19] fleshes out the discussion of spatial interactions in more
detail than we gave it in the target article. When interactions between agents are simple, mathematical
descriptions of populations can be used, and in the target article we discuss several such applications. Bellomo
and Elaiw highlight in particular applications of agent-based simulations in social economics as well as in
crowd behavior, where the interactions between agents can be complex, involve memories of past encounters,
have a stochastic element, are non-transitive, or even nonlinear. Such agent-based simulations can lead to
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surprising insights (see, e.g., the simulation of escape panic behavior [20]). After all, this must be measuring
stick for using agent-based simulations: if you cannot get more out of them than you put in, then you are not
using this tool optimally.
Because agent-based simulations rely on the applications of defined rules in a systematic and consistent
fashion, the success of agent-based simulations in EGT is not at all unreasonable. It is in fact expected as
long as such simulations are used with the same kind of care and control that the theoretical and experimental
approach is known for. It is true that the “science of computational simulation” is not always taught, and
because it is a relative newcomer in the arsenal of scientific inquiry, it is often neglected. It is perhaps because
such caution is not always exercised that computational simulations (in particular of the evolutionary process)
are sometimes greeted with skepticism. But giving up on them would turn out to be a missed opportunity
rivaling that which Dyson wrote about more than 40 years ago, when he lamented the missed opportunities of
mathematicians that could have drawn inspiration from modern developments in theoretical physics [21]. The
estrangement between mathematics and physics that Dyson bemoaned appears to be a thing of the past, but
we should be ever watchful that disciplines that can inform each other (here, mathematics and computational
science) do not go their separate ways. Thus we would like to close this response with the same call that Dyson
issued in his essay, who quoted the mathematician Jacques Hadamard who warned (in the gender-specific way
of those times):
“It is important for him who wants to discover not to confine himself to one chapter of science, but to keep
in touch with various others.”
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